Abstract. Default logic is one of the most widely used formalisms to formalize commonsense reasoning. In this paper we analyze the complexity of deciding whether a propositional interpretation is a model of a default theory for some of the variants of default logic presented in the literature. We prove that all the analyzed variants have the same complexity and that this problem is in general Σ p 2 complete, while it is coNP complete under some restrictions on the form of the defaults.
INTRODUCTION
Among all the formalisms proposed to model commonsense reasoning, default logic [15] is one of the most successful ones. Many aspects of default logic have been analyzed in the literature: semantics, algorithms, complexity, relationship with other formalisms, and so on.
In this paper we focus on a specific usage of default logic, that is, on using it as a tool to represent information in the form of sets of models. Any knowledge representation formalism is a formal tool to represent information about the world. Here we focus on default logic as a way to represent sets of models and, in particular, on the computational complexity of deciding the following problem:
Given a default theory D, W and an interpretation M , decide if there exists an extension E of D, W such that M |= E.
This problem is better known as model checking. There are several reasons why model checking is of interest in AI. First of all, as convincingly suggested by Levesque [13] and advocated by Halpern and Vardi in [11] , model-based representations are considered a viable alternative to the standard approach of representing knowledge in terms of formulae. In modelbased representations the basic computational task is model checking, not inference. In this setting it is also very important to study the computational complexity of model checking.
While the computational complexity of inference and model checking are related, there is no way to automatically derive the results for model checking from those already known for inference.
The computational complexity of model checking is also strictly related to another computational aspect of knowledge representation formalisms: their representational compactness. Some recent papers [5, 8, 4] compactness of a knowledge representation formalism is strictly related to the complexity of model checking. Due to the lack of space not all proofs are presented. We present those that are, in our opinion, the most interesting ones and sketch out or completely omit all the others.
DEFINITIONS
Default logic has been defined by Reiter [15] . In default logic knowledge about the world is divided into two parts, representing certain knowledge and defeasible rules, respectively. A default theory is a pair D, W , where D and W are as above. The semantics of a default theory D, W is based on the notion of extension, which is a possible state of the world according to the knowledge base. Formally, an extension is a fixpoint of the operator Γ defined as follows. Let A be a set of propositional formulas; Γ(A) is the smallest set such that:
Note that an extension is a deductively closed set of formulae. We say that a default The set GD(E, D, W ) of generating defaults has the property (see [15] ) that each extension E of D, W is the deductive closure of
The set of generating defaults gives a compact representation of an extension of a default theory, which by definition is a deductively closed set of formulae, hence infinite.
Many variants of default logic have been proposed in the literature. In this paper we also take into account those proposed by Lukaszewicz [14] , Brewka [1] and Delgrande, Schaub and Jackson [6] . For more details on these systems we refer the reader to the original papers.
There are two forms of inference w.r.t. a default theory that have been defined in the literature: skeptical and credulous. In this paper we only concentrate on the first form because it is the only one that can be characterized in terms of sets of models. We say that a formula α is a skeptical consequence of a default theory D, W , denoted as D, W |= α, if for all extensions E of D, W we have that α ∈ E. There is a semantic counterpart to this definition: The set of models of a default theory is the union of the set of models of all the extensions. We can now define the problem of model checking: 
Computational complexity
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of computational complexity. We use the standard notation of complexity classes that can be found in [12] . Namely, the class P denotes the set of problems whose solution can be found in polynomial time by a deterministic Turing machine, while NP denotes the class of problems that can be resolved in polynomial time by a non-deterministic Turing machine. The class coNP denotes the set of decision problems whose complement is in NP. We call NP-hard a problem G if any instance of a generic problem NP can can reduced to an instance of G by means of a polynomial-time (many-one) transformation (the same for coNP hard).
Clearly, P ⊆ NP and P ⊆ coNP. We assume, in line with the prevailing assumptions of computational complexity, that these containments are strict, that is P = NP and P = coNP. Therefore, we call a problem that is in P tractable, and a problem that is NP-hard or coNP-hard intractable (in the sense that any algorithm resolving it would require a super polynomial amount of time in the worst case).
We also use higher complexity classes defined using oracles. In particular P A (NP A ) corresponds to the class of decision problems that are solved in polynomial time by deterministic (nondeterministic) Turing machines using an oracle for A in polynomial time (for a much more detailed presentation we refer the reader to [12] 
Notice that ∆ 
COMPLEXITY: GENERAL CASE
We first focus on the most general situation where no constraints are imposed on the syntactic format of the defaults. In particular, we show that deciding whether a propositional interpretation is a model of a default theory under the skeptical semantics is Σ p 2 complete, even if the defaults are prerequisitefree and semi-normal.
In the following section we show that the problem is ∆ p 2 [log n] hard and in ∆ p 2 , if all the defaults are normal (when prerequisites are allowed) and that model checking is coNP complete if all the defaults are both prerequisite-free and normal.
Our analysis takes advantage of the results obtained by Gottlob in [9] , where he shows that the complexity of deciding whether D, W |= α is Π p 2 complete even in the most restricted cases. This result holds even if all the defaults are prerequisite-free and normal.
Our results, that apply to all considered variants of default logic, are summarized in Table 1 . While the proof of membership is almost straightforward, the proof of hardness is a bit more complex. Proof. We prove the hardness of the problem by reduction from the problem QBF. Let ∃X∀Y.F be a quantified boolean formula. We prove that this formula is valid if and only if
The idea is that in all the extensions in which the first default is applicable, w holds, thus M is not a model of that extension. For example, if ¬F is consistent, it is always possible to apply the first default, but the extension obtained in this manner does not have M as a model.
1. Let us assume that there is a truth evaluation X 1 ⊆ X such that, for all the evaluations Y1 ⊆ Y it holds that X1 ∪ Y1 is a model of F . Consider the following set of formulas.
The set E = Cn(A) is an extension since it contains W , it is closed under deduction, and for each default either the default is not applicable or the consequence is in E. Let us prove that last point. Consider the first default.
We prove that ¬(w ∧ ¬F ) ∈ E, which is equivalent to A |= ¬(w ∧ ¬F ). Applying the properties of propositional calculus we obtain
The last formula is true, because for each Y1 the interpretation X 1 ∪ Y 1 is a model of F . As a result, the justification of the first default is false in E.
Consider the default :w∧(w→x i ) w→x i
. If w → xi ∈ A, then the justification is consistent with A, and the consequence of the default is in E. On the other hands, if w → ¬xi ∈ A, then the justification of the default is false in E.
Summarizing, the set E is an extension since it contains W , it is closed under deduction, and for any default either the justification is false or the consequence is in the set. Since the interpretation M is a model of E, it holds that M is also a model of the default theory D, W .
2. Let now assume that there exists an extension E such that M |= E. This implies that w ∈ E, as a result the justification of the first default must be false in E, that is E |= ¬(w ∧ ¬F ). This condition is equivalent to E |= w → F , which is in turns equivalent to E ∪ {w} |= F . Now, the last default has not been applied. About the other defaults: for each x i either w → x i or w → ¬x i is in E. As a result, E ∪ {w} gives a complete evaluation of the atoms in X. Since E ∪ {w} |= F , it follows that there exists a truth evaluation of the atom in X such that F is valid for each evaluation of the atoms in Y .
The following theorem shows the complexity of model checking for constrained, cumulative and justified default logic [14, 1, 6] . 
COMPLEXITY: NORMAL DEFAULTS
Both constrained and justified default logic have been proposed to overcome some shortcomings of classical default logic in the treatment of the justifications and their mutual consistency. When we restrict to normal defaults all the differences disappear and these three systems coincide. Moreover, they also coincide with cumulative default logic when the initial set of facts W has empty support. Therefore, our lower bounds for classical default logic immediately apply to all systems, while the upper bounds applies to all systems except cumulative default logic for which we provide a different proof.
We first show an upper bound on the complexity of model checking for normal default logic with prerequisites: 
Proof (sketch).
Let G be a subset of D defined as follows.
The set D\G has an important property: if any of the defaults in D\G is in the set of generating defaults of an extension, then M is not a model of that extension. This holds because, by construction, . The generic step i goes as follows: verify whether E |= αi and E ∧ β i is consistent. If this is the case, let E = E ∪ {β i }, i = 1 and D = D\{di}. Otherwise, let i = i+1. The reason we reset i to 1 is that, if a default i is discovered to be applicable, its consequence βi comes to be true. It may be the case that there is a default d j with j < i such that E |= α j but E ∪ {β i } |= α j . As a result, the defaults d 1 , . . . , d i+1 have to be checked again. This is why we reset i to 1.
The algorithm ends when i has reached the last default of G, and has to be increased again.
This way, E is obtained by applying some defaults of G. In order to build an extension, we have to verify whether the defaults of D\G are applicable. This is done by verifying whether E |= α and E ∧ β is consistent for each default α :β β ∈ D\G. If one of those default is applicable, then β should be put in E. Since M |= β , if follows that M |= D, W , that is, M is not a model of the default theory.
Summarizing, there are two consistency checks for each default. The first phase of the algorithm analyzes at most k 2 /2 defaults, thus there are at most k 2 consistency checkings. The second phase requires at most 2(n − k) consistency checking, where n is the total number of default in the theory. Thus, the whole algorithm can be executed with a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle.
A similar construction proves the same result for Brewka's cumulative default logic. We construct the set G as above, then we use the boolean function ROBUST presented by Gottlob and Mingyi in [10, pg. 339 ] to decide whether G is in fact a set of generating defaults. Since Gottlob and Mingyi have shown that this boolean function can be decided with a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle, the thesis follows.
Notice that the complexity has decreased by almost one level (from Σ p 2 to ∆ p 2 ) by restricting to normal defaults. We want to point out that this phenomenon did not arise with the complexity of inference [9] where the complexity for general and normal default theories is the same.
In order to determine the lower bound of the complexity for normal default with prerequisites, we need the following Lemma: Proof. We prove the claim by reduction from the problem of the lexicographically minimal model above.
Consider the case k = 2. There are four possible cases. The result should be "yes" in cases 2 and 4, and "no" in the other two cases. We use the defaults to capture each case. Namely, we prove that M |= D, W if and only if the lexicographically minimal model of F has not x 2 , where
The idea is: since M |= W , if no default is applicable, then M is a model of the extension. The first default is applicable only in case 1, while the second one is applicable only in case 3. The consequence of both defaults contains w. As a result, if any of the defaults is applicable then M is not in the extension.
Consider the first default. It is applicable only if W |= w → (x 1 ∧ x 2 ). This is equivalent to say that F ∧ ¬x 1 and F ∧ ¬x 2 are both inconsistent. The consequence of the default is w, thus M is not in the extension.
The second default is applicable only if W |= w → (x 1 ∨ x2), and w ∧ ¬x1 is consistent with W . The first condition is equivalent to the inconsistency of F ∧ ¬x 1 ∧ ¬x 2 , while the second one is equivalent to the consistency of F ∧ ¬x1. This is exactly the case 3.
This way we proved that it is possible to determine the value of the second variable of the lexicographically minimal model of a formula. This idea can be extended to determine the value of the k-th variable. The idea is as follows. Since k = log n, there are only 2 k = n possible cases. Half of these cases leads to a minimal model that contains x k . For each of these cases we put a default with w among the consequence, so that M is excluded from the extension. Each case can be verified with (at most) k checks of inconsistency and a single check of consistency.
For each of these cases we use a single default. If the inconsistency checks are on the formulas F ∧R 1 , F ∧R 2 , . . ., F ∧R m , the prerequisite of the default is w → (¬R 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬R m ). If the consistency check is on F ∧ S, the justification (and consequence) of the default is w ∧ S.
Since these are n defaults, this is a reduction from the problem of the minimal model to model checking of default logics.
If all the defaults are prerequisite-free and normal, then the problem is only coNP complete.
Theorem 7
The complexity of model checking of skeptical default is coNP complete, if all the defaults are prerequisitefree and normal.
Proof (sketch).
Hardness is proved by reduction from the problem of model checking for circumscription. In fact, Cadoli [2] has shown that model checking for circumscription is coNP complete and Etherington [7] has shown a reduction from circumscription into prerequisite-free normal default logic.
The membership is harder to prove. Let M be an interpretation and D, W a default theory. 
